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Are there untapped opportunities to achieve good outcomes in nuclear proliferation, safety, and security? In pursuit of these goals, governments and international agencies have relied on coercive means above all—laws, regulations, and licensing requirements at home; and export controls, sanctions, and the use of force abroad.
Another approach to these goals is to create incentives to encourage, not enforce, the desired behaviors. Both financial and non-financial means can be developed to draw states away from building proliferation-sensitive fuel-cycle facilities and to support good stewardship of nuclear facilities and spent fuel.
Thomas Wood, Robert Otto, and Tristan Volpe will discuss their recent articles in the “Nonproliferation Review” on positive inducements for nuclear proliferation, safety, and security. James Casterton will respond by addressing the policy and global governance implications of these proposals in a moderated discussion with Joshua Pollack.
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
1779 Massachusetts Ave NW
Washington DC 20036